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55 
WINNER, WINNER, NO CHICKEN DINNER:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIVE MEDIA ENT’MT & 
GAMING ASS’N V. ATT’Y GEN. OF THE U.S. AND 
THE UNJUSTIFIED CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
UIGEA  
 
This note observes the deficiencies of the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), placing special emphasis on the 
2009 Third Circuit decision in Interactive Media Entertainment and Gam-
ing Association v. Attorney General of the United States, which upheld the 
constitutionality of the UIGEA. Since the initial preparation of this note, 
the federal government has initiated its enforcement and shut down of some 
of the largest United States internet gaming sites, referencing the UIGEA 
as the source for its authority. This note proposes a complete overhaul of 
the present enforcement tactics by means of repealing the UIGEA and in-
stead establishing a statutory scheme which would allow for internet gam-
ing in the United States. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are seated at a poker table with nine other faces glaring back and 
forth between you and the four cards sprawled on the table, studying your 
every move.  They wait for you to make a move as adrenaline pumps 
through your veins and anxiety sets in.  With thousands on the line and two 
clubs on the table, all you need is one more club to make your Ace high 
flush and the best possible hand in play.  The dealer slowly turns the defin-
ing card, but does it really even matter? 
Poker players and card players alike often insist they play the game 
solely for money—a business endeavor of sorts.  Whether players admit to 
it or not, it is all about the action.  As recent scientific studies have shown, 
it is not entirely true that gamblers are purely in it for the win—rather, it is 
the rush of the risk that leaves people coming back for more.1  As an indi-
vidual’s gambling habits progress, studies show that physical changes take 
                                                           
1. Randy Shore, Gambling Affects Brain, Research Finds, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 29, 
2008, at A12. 
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place in the brain, including the release of dopamine and transformations in 
areas of the brain “associated with planning and forming strategies.”2  
Many of these physical symptoms are said to parallel those of drug addic-
tion.3  As a result, there are concerns that this recreational activity will lead 
to increases in pathological gambling, underage gambling, and criminal be-
havior.4 
Due to these and other financial concerns, several states within the 
United States, and more recently the United States in its federal capacity, 
have enacted legislation limiting access to gambling.5  The most recent leg-
islation concerns the modern-day phenomenon of Internet gambling.  
Gambling today “no longer evokes the images of Frank Sinatra and Dean 
Martin playing on a neon stage with well-dressed, wealthy patrons.”6  Like 
never before, gamblers can relax at home and try to beat the odds with just 
a click of a mouse.  To curb the growth of this industry, the federal gov-
ernment has passed legislation, including the Wire Act of 1961,7 the Travel 
Act,8 and the Illegal Gambling Business Act.9  With little to no success in 
ceasing Internet gambling, Congress has enacted the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA” or “Act”), greatly impact-
ing financial institutions involved in the industry.10 
This Note analyzes the effects of the UIGEA as it has been interpreted 
in recent court decisions.  Specifically, it focuses on a recent Third Circuit 
case that upheld the constitutionality of the Act.11  Part II provides a his-
                                                           
2. Id. 
3. Gambling’s Rush Pushes Lawyer to Brink of Losing Big, MASS. BAR ASS’N LAWYERS 
J., July-Aug. 2009, at 10, http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-
journal/2009/julyaugust/gambling-rush (discussing the effects that online gambling has on law-
yers).  
4. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-89, INTERNET GAMBLING:  AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE ISSUES 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE]. 
5. Katherine A. Valasek, Comment, Winning the Jackpot:  A Framework for Successful In-
ternational Regulation of Online Gambling and the Value of the Self-Regulating Entities, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 753, 756, 759-60 (2007).   
6. Lisa Lester, Comment, Beating the Odds:  Regulation of Online Gaming Stateside and 
Abroad, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 621, 621 (2008). 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006). 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006); Yevgeniya Roysen, Note, Taking Chances:  The United 
States’ Policy on Internet Gambling and Its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 873, 876-78 (2009). 
10. Roysen, supra note 9, at 879. 
11. See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d 113 
(3d Cir. 2009) (finding that gambling does not involve constitutionally protected individual inter-
ests).  
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torical analysis of federal legislation and case analysis with respect to In-
ternet gambling.  Part III focuses on the Third Circuit decision upholding 
the UIGEA.  Part IV analyzes the implications of the Act or any ban on In-
ternet gambling.  Part V offers an alternative explanation of the effects of 
the UIGEA and recent court decisions upholding the Act.  This Note argues 
that the financial burdens far outweigh the benefits of the UIGEA.  Part VI 
proposes that gambling should not be banned in its entirety, but instead 
regulated for the benefit of the government and the public as a whole.   
II. BACKGROUND 
 Before the 1990s, the only legal form of gambling took place at tra-
ditional brick-and-mortar casinos.12  Over the past few decades, legalized 
gambling in the United States has transformed into a “commonplace activ-
ity undertaken by the masses.”13  In 1995, the first online gambling site was 
created.14  Internet gambling more than doubled by 1998, both in players 
and in revenue.15  In 2002, United States gamblers constituted fifty to sev-
enty percent of the total revenues for United States Internet gambling op-
erators.16  Concerns about the social and moral repercussions resulting from 
the ease of access to this growing industry were mounting.17  
A. Unsuccessful Attempts at Regulation 
 The first piece of legislation passed to limit the use of Internet gam-
bling was created long before the problem of such gambling itself arose.  
Congress enacted the Wire Act of 1961 to discourage organized crime.18  
The Wire Act makes it illegal for  people participating in the “business of 
betting or wagering [to] knowingly [use] a wire communication facility for 
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or in-
                                                           
12. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6.  
13. Jason A. Miller, Note, Don’t Bet on This Legislation:  The Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions Than Internet Gambling, 12 
N.C. BANKING INST. 185, 186 (2008). 
14. Lester, supra note 6, at 621.  
15. Id. at 621–22 (stating that Internet gambling doubled from $300 million in 1997 to 
$651 million in 1998, and the number of gamblers increased from 6.9 million to 14.5 million). 
16. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6. 
17. Mark Reutter, Social Costs of Gambling Nearly Half That of Drug Abuse, New Book 
Concludes, NEWS BUREAU U. ILL., Mar. 8, 2004, 
http://news.illinois.edu/news/04/0308grinols.html. 
18. Brant M. Leonard, Note, Highlighting the Drawbacks of the UIGEA:  Proposed Rules 
Reveal Heavy Burdens, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 515, 518 (2009). 
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formation assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event 
or contest.”19  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has argued that the Wire 
Act should be interpreted to include Internet gambling communications.20  
Two cases played a critical role in defining the boundaries of the Wire Act 
as it pertains to Internet gambling.21 
 In United States v. Cohen, the defendant owned and operated an An-
tigua-based bookmaking business, primarily servicing United States cus-
tomers.22  A customer would create an account, based in Antigua, for the 
purposes of using the funds therein to place bets and wagers on sporting 
events.23  The court upheld the defendant’s conviction under the Wire Act, 
finding that Cohen “knowingly transmitted information assisting in the 
placing of bets.”24  This ruling was significant because it was the first to 
hold that the Wire Act applied to Internet gambling activities.25  Still, one 
issue remained unresolved.  Because the Wire Act specifically states that 
its purpose is to regulate “sporting events or contests,”26 the ruling left open 
the question of whether the Wire Act would apply to all Internet gaming in 
general.27 
 The Fifth Circuit soon addressed this issue in In re MasterCard In-
ternational, Inc.28  There, the two plaintiffs had engaged in Internet gam-
bling by using their credit cards to place wagers.29  The plaintiffs argued 
that MasterCard, and the other named defendant credit card companies, 
knowingly engaged in unlawful activity by allowing their cardholders to 
place wagers on off-shore Internet sites with the purpose of profiting on 
gambling debts.30  The court refused to apply the Wire Act to the defendant 
credit card companies, holding that “a plain reading of the statutory lan-
guage clearly requires that the object of the gambling be a sporting event or 
contest.”31  In effect, the Wire Act does not apply to any Internet gambling 
activities outside sports wagering, leaving poker and several other card and 
                                                           
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006). 
20.  Leonard, supra note 18, at 518.  
21. See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001); In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 
132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001). 
22. Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70.   
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 76.    
25. Id.   
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006). 
27. Leonard, supra note 18, at 519. 
28. In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001). 
29. Id. at 474. 
30. Id. at 475. 
31. Id. at 480. 
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game sites untouched. 
 Several more laws passed in the 1960s, such as the Travel Act, the 
Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act (“ITWPA”), and, 
later, the Illegal Gambling Business Act (“IGBA”) appeared to apply to In-
ternet gambling.32  All three pieces of legislation aimed to curtail organized 
crime associated with gambling and bookmaking.33 
The Travel Act states:  “Whoever travels in interstate or foreign 
commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign com-
merce, with [the] intent to—distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activ-
ity; or . . . otherwise promote . . . any unlawful activity . . . shall be fined 
under this title . . . .”34  The Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” as “any 
business or enterprise involving gambling . . . in violation of the laws of the 
State . . . .”35  The Travel Act seemingly mended the problems with the 
Wire Act by omitting the enumeration of activities deemed illegal, and 
thereby expanding its scope.36  Nonetheless, it suffers from many of the 
same defects as the Wire Act.  Namely, the Travel Act applies only to the 
operators of illegal businesses, not to the bettors themselves.37  Addition-
ally, it is not clear whether wireless communications would be covered by 
the Travel Act.38 
Alternatively, the “ITWPA criminalizes the introduction into inter-
state commerce of ‘any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, 
token, paper, writing or other device used, or to be used’ in illegal gam-
bling.”39  Unlike the Travel Act, it is enough under the ITWPA that the 
perpetrator knowingly moves such paraphernalia into interstate com-
merce.40  Specific intent is not required, which means that a subscriber to 
an Internet gambling site who downloads the required software is in viola-
tion of the ITWPA.41  
                                                           
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006). 
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006). 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2000). 
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2000). 
36. Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition:  The Federal Government's Approach to 
Internet Gambling, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 162, 168 (2009). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Michael D. Schmitt, Note, Prohibition Reincarnated?  The Uncertain Future of Online 
Gambling Following the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 17 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 381, 387 (2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (2006)). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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The IGBA prohibits the operation of illegal gambling businesses.42  
An illegal gambling business is one which:  (1) violates the laws of the 
State in which it is conducted; (2) involves five or more persons; and (3) 
has been in continuous operation for a period of more than thirty days, or 
generates or has generated a gross revenue of at least $2,000 on any given 
day.43  “Like the Wire Act, the IGBA only applie[s] to gambling busi-
nesses, not individual gamblers.”44 
 Congress attempted to pass a further prohibition on Internet gam-
bling that focused on the financial institutions supporting the industry with 
the Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“IGEA”).45  However, the IGEA 
failed in the Senate,46 leaving the legality of Internet gambling unresolved.  
As a result, Internet gambling sites continued their operations into the early 
2000s.47 
 Although Internet gambling sites seem to violate a number of the 
laws addressed above, “[t]he Wire Act … has been the predominant tool 
used to prosecute Internet gambling across state and international lines.”48  
Presumably, this is because it is easier to obtain a conviction under the 
Wire Act since it does not require a violation of any state law.49  However, 
recent case law has limited the “applicability of the Wire Act to certain 
forms of Internet gambling[,]” leaving the Department of Justice in need of 
alternative means by which to target this arena.50 
B. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”) 
 Despite the unsuccessful enforcement of the Wire Act and its legis-
lative counterparts as they applied to Internet gambling, many financial in-
stitutions were buckled down by pressures from local law enforcement 
agencies to cease their participation in the online gambling industry.51  In 
2003, then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer signed agreements 
with ten banks that promised to block cardholders from using their credit 
cards for online gambling purposes.52  Spitzer assured the public that “[t]he 
                                                           
42. Roysen, supra note 9, at 877. 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2006). 
44. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 4, at 14. 
45. Grahmann, supra note 36, at 170. 
46. Id. at 171.  
47. Schmitt, supra note 39, at 389. 
48. Id. at 387. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Miller, supra note 13, at 191. 
52. Spitzer, Banks Target Internet Gambling Via Credit Card, BUS. J. – CENT. N.Y., Feb. 
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vast majority of credit card issuers . . .  [had] recognized their legal, ethical, 
and business obligation [sic] to block credit-card transactions identified as 
online gambling.”53  These self-regulatory practices may have been the 
“catalyst[s] for a shift in focus with many federal legislators [eventually 
leading] to the adoption of the UIGEA.”54 
 Congress passed the UIGEA in 2006 during its last days in session 
as an earmark to the SAFE Port Act.55  The UIGEA makes it illegal for any 
“person engaged in the business of betting or wagering [to] knowingly ac-
cept, in connection with the participation of another person in unlawful In-
ternet gambling” various forms of payment, including credit.56  Like its un-
successful predecessors, the UIGEA targets the financial institutions that 
profit from Internet gambling, not the individual gamblers themselves.57  
The Act defines unlawful Internet gambling as “plac[ing], receiv[ing], or 
otherwise knowingly transmit[ting] a bet or wager by any means which in-
volves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is 
unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law … in the State” where it 
was made.58  In effect, it manages to maintain individual state autonomy by 
continuing to grant states the right to determine Internet gambling laws 
within their boundaries.59 
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT UPHOLDS THE UIGEA 
 In the most recent appellate court decision regarding online gam-
bling, the Third Circuit upheld the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforce-
ment Act (“UIGEA”) as constitutional.60  The appellant, Interactive Media 
Entertainment and Gaming Association, Inc. (“Interactive”), was a New 
Jersey non-profit organization that collected and distributed information 
                                                                                                                                      
21, 2003, at 14. 
53. Id. 
54. Miller, supra note 13, at 193. 
55. Id. at 195;  see also U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-86T, MARITIME 
SECURITY:  THE SAFE PORT ACT AND EFFORTS TO SECURE OUR NATION’S SEAPORTS 1-3 
(2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0886t.pdf (explaining that the SAFE Port 
Act was a post-9/11 attempt to secure seaport boundaries by establishing heightened security cri-
teria). 
56. 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).  
57. Roysen, supra note 9, at 879. 
58. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (2006). 
59. See generally id. 
60. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d 113, 
119 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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regarding Internet gambling.61  Interactive’s clients were businesses that 
provided Internet gaming services throughout the world, including in the 
United States.62 
A. Procedural Posture 
In its complaint, Interactive sought to enjoin the government from en-
forcing the Act on two grounds:  (1) the Act was unconstitutional on its 
face; and (2) it violated United States treaty obligations.63  The government 
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.64  Although the lower 
court found that Interactive had standing to sue, it nonetheless dismissed 
the action on its merits.65 
B. The Appeal 
Article III of the Constitution “limits the jurisdiction of federal courts 
to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’” which can be properly resolved by means 
of the judicial process.66  This notion is referred to as the doctrine of stand-
ing, and it prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions.67 The plaintiff 
in a lawsuit bears the burden of showing that he or she has brought forth a 
case or controversy so that the court can establish jurisdiction over the 
claim.68  To assert standing, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 
(1) an injury in fact; (2) which is concrete and particularized; and (3) which 
is actual or imminent.69  In the present case, Plaintiff Interactive struggled 
to show that it suffered an injury in fact or “an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest.”70 
Interactive claimed that it could prove injury in fact on the basis of 
three separate “injuries suffered by its members under the UIGEA:  (1) a 
threat of criminal prosecution or civil liability; (2) a chilling effect on the 
exercise of First Amendment rights; and (3) imminent financial ruin.”71  
                                                           
61. Id. at 114 
62. Id. 
63. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d 114-15 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
64. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, No. 07-2625, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16903, at 5 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2008). 
65. Id. at 14-15, 36. 
66. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). 
67. Id. at 560. 
68. Id. at 561 
69. Id. at 560 
70. Id. 
71. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, No. 07-2625, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
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The court held that because Interactive alleged First Amendment harm on 
behalf of its members, and because the UIGEA did not create a provision 
which exempted Interactive’s members from criminal prosecution if it did 
not conform its actions in accordance with the statute, Interactive’s mem-
bers did have an injury in fact.72  Furthermore, this injury was not a subjec-
tive unsubstantiated fear, but rather an immediate threat of criminal penal-
ties and financial burdens, which are distinct and palpable,73 and therefore 
sufficient for standing purposes.74  However, this analysis applied only to 
the members of Interactive’s association.75  As to whether Interactive itself 
could establish associational standing to bring a claim on behalf of its 
members,76 the District Court found that the organization’s goal of “repre-
sent[ing] the interests of persons and companies which provide Internet in-
teractive [gaming and gambling services]” was germane to the members’ 
interests of protecting their First Amendment rights.77  On appeal, the Third 
Circuit affirmed these holdings without further elaboration.78 
1. Constitutional Claims 
Interactive’s claims regarding the facial constitutionality of the Act 
were as follows:      (1) expressive association; (2) commercial speech; (3) 
overbreadth and vagueness; (4) privacy;       (5) World Trade Organization 
                                                                                                                                      
LEXIS 16903, at 7 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2008). 
72. Id. at 13. 
73. As part of the test for establishing injury in fact for standing purposes, a plaintiff must 
show that he or she suffered a “distinct and palpable” harm as opposed to an “abstract” or “con-
jectural” harm.  Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law and Equity:  A Defense of Citizen and Tax-
payer Suits, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 17-18 (2002) (“In essence there is a requirement that the defen-
dant’s conduct be the cause of a distinct injury to the plaintiff not shared by other individuals for 
which the legal system can provide an appropriate remedy.”). 
74. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16903, 
at 13.  
75. Id. at 14–15. 
76. Associations are generally able to represent their injured members in court in order to 
provide greater public access to government agency action.  However, such representation must 
adhere to appropriate guidelines.  Fla. Home Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp. Sec., 412 
So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1982) (“An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 
when:  (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”) (emphasis 
added).  
77. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16903, 
at 17.  See supra text accompanying note 73.  
78. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d 113, 
118 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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claims; (6) an ex post facto clause claim; and (7) a Tenth Amendment 
claim.79  On appeal, the court reviewed only the allegations pertaining to 
vagueness and privacy.80 
a. Vagueness 
Interactive alleged that the UIGEA was unconstitutionally vague and 
ambiguous because “the statutory phrase ‘unlawful Internet gambling’ 
lack[ed] an ‘ascertainable and workable definition.’”81  A statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague if it fails to provide notice to a person of ordinary intel-
ligence or where it lacks standards, which may promote discriminatory en-
forcement of the statute.82  Furthermore, a claim that a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face requires the plaintiff to prove that it is 
vague in all possible applications of the statute.83 
The court’s response was three-fold.  First, it noted that the statute 
was clear because it unambiguously made it illegal for any gambling busi-
ness to knowingly accept payment in a jurisdiction that does not allow In-
ternet gambling or from a person who places a bet in such a jurisdiction.84  
The court did not elaborate, but merely concluded that this sufficiently pro-
vided a person of ordinary intelligence with proper notice as to what con-
duct the Act prohibits.85 
Second, the court found that the UIGEA was not vague in all of its 
applications.86  The court demonstrated that the application of the statute 
would be clear in states where a law barred Internet gambling.  For exam-
ple, because Hawaii has statutes illegalizing Internet gambling,87 if a person 
in Hawaii places a bet a gambling business that knowingly accepts payment 
on that bet would be in violation of the Act.88  Additionally, Oregon has 
similarly enacted statutes illegalizing Internet gambling.89 
                                                           
79. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, No. 07-2625, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16903, at 2-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2008). 
80. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d at 115–
17. 
81. Id. at 115. 
82. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 
83. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d at 116 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 497 (1982)). 
84. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d at 116.  
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712-1220(4), 712–1223 (1993). 
88. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y. Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d at 116. 
89. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.109 (2003).  See also Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, 
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In dicta, the court in Interactive added another scenario that would 
violate the Act—namely, when a person places a bet from a state where In-
ternet gambling is illegal and the gambling business accepting the bet was 
in another country.90  Because a “country can regulate conduct occurring 
outside its territory which causes harmful results within its territory,” a bid 
accepted in a foreign territory violates the Act.91  In sum, the court held the 
Act was not vague in all applications and, therefore, not facially unconstitu-
tional on such grounds.92 
Lastly, the court considered the allegation that the Act was overly 
vague.  Appellant Interactive claimed the UIGEA did not establish the ille-
gality of any particular conduct in and of itself, “but rather incorporate[d] 
other Federal or State law related to gambling.”93  While the court con-
ceded that the Act did not create a distinct offense, it refused to find vague-
ness on these grounds.94  It recognized that incorporation of other provi-
sions does not render a statute unconstitutional because “a reasonable 
person of ordinary intelligence would consult the incorporated provi-
sions.”95  Furthermore, the court recognized that the fact that the Act would 
be legal in some states but illegal in others is insufficient to render it un-
constitutionally vague.96 
Interactive also pointed out the difficulty in determining jurisdiction 
over Internet activities.97  It argued that because it would be difficult to de-
termine from which jurisdiction a person placed the online wager, it would 
be nearly impossible to know whether acceptance of such a wager was un-
lawful.98  In response, the court noted that the determining factor for 
vagueness was not “the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to de-
termine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but 
rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.”99  The court re-
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garded the issue as a substantive matter to be determined on its merits, not 
one which fails to put a gambling business on notice of the legal conse-
quences of its actions.100 
b. Privacy 
In its second argument, appellant Interactive claimed that the UIGEA 
“violate[s] a constitutional right of individuals to engage in gambling-
related activity in the privacy of their homes.”101  Before evaluating the 
claim on its merits, the court first addressed the preliminary issue of 
whether Interactive could assert third-party standing on behalf of its indi-
vidual members.102  To assert third-party standing, the plaintiff must prove:  
(1) injury; (2) a “close relationship” with the third party; and (3) the third 
party faces some obstacle that prevents it from bringing forth its own 
claim.103  Here, the court ultimately concluded that Interactive did not sat-
isfy the prerequisites to assert third-party standing because it did not share 
a close relationship with the gamblers whose rights it claimed were vio-
lated; rather, Interactive’s member companies did.104  Nonetheless, the 
court noted that third-party standing requirements were merely prudential 
and developed by the courts themselves, and not jurisdictional require-
ments imposed by the Constitution.105  Accordingly, the court went on to 
determine that Interactive’s claim failed on its merits.106 
 Appellant Interactive focused its argument on the opinions in Law-
rence v. Texas and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle.107  Both cases “in-
volved . . . sexual conduct between consenting adults in the privacy of the 
home.”108  The court distinguished these two scenarios, finding that 
“[g]ambling, even in the home, simply does not involve any individual in-
terests of the same constitutional magnitude,” and is therefore not protected 
by any constitutional right to privacy.109  With no more than a few superfi-
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cial statements, the court affirmed the district court’s decision and refused 
to find any constitutional protection for adult gaming in the privacy of the 
home.110 
IV. A MERITORIOUS OPINION? 
 As indicated above, a plaintiff, whether a natural person or a legal 
entity, must have standing to challenge a statute’s enforcement.111  The 
court in Interactive suggested that even an entity such as appellant Interac-
tive, which  had no direct relationship with individual gamblers, may bring 
a constitutional claim based on vagueness via associational standing if it 
and its member entities suffer from the harms that give rise to the cause of 
action.112  Still, the court denied standing on the privacy claim because nei-
ther Interactive nor its member entities were allegedly harmed as a result of 
privacy violations; rather, it was the individual gamblers who were 
harmed.113  But, if Interactive lacked standing to assert the privacy claim in 
the first place, does the court’s continuing analysis on the merits hold any 
validity or is it mere dicta? 
 Although the Third Circuit failed to address this issue in Interactive, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has found that “[f]or a court to pronounce upon the 
meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no ju-
risdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”114  In 
making this assertion, however, the Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment referred only to standing issues arising under Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution.115  The Court articulated that determining the 
existence of a cause of action prior to an issue of statutory standing is 
proper, since “[i]t has nothing to do with whether there is a case or contro-
versy under Article III.”116  In effect, prudential standing issues, like the 
third-party standing issues determined in Interactive, “do not carry a risk of 
plunging a court into issuing advisory opinions.”117  Therefore, the Third 
Circuit in Interactive properly analyzed the merits of appellant’s constitu-
tional privacy claim, despite its assertion that appellant Interactive lacked 
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third-party standing to bring the claim on behalf of individual gamblers. 
A. The Vagueness of the UIGEA 
On the issue of vagueness, the court in Interactive found the provi-
sions within the Act were sufficient to provide a person of reasonable intel-
ligence notice of what activity is prohibited.118  Yet, in its own analysis, the 
court failed to exact a consistent definition of the terms of the Act.  The 
court opined that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 
(“UIGEA”) focuses solely on businesses, like that of appellant, which are 
directly affiliated with the industry of Internet gaming.119  In fact, the court 
specifically pointed to the language of the Act itself, indicating that the 
phrase “the business of betting or wagering”: 
“ . . . does not include the activities of a financial transaction provider, 
or any interactive computer service or telecommunications service.” . . .  
Thus, the criminal prohibition contained in § 5363 of the Act applies only 
to gambling-related businesses, not any financial intermediary or Internet-
service provider whose services are used in connection with an unlawful 
bet.120 
This phrase suggests that the UIGEA applies only to those companies 
that directly provide Internet gaming services and their advertising coun-
terparts.   
However, the court later stated the UIGEA itself requires that certain 
financial institutions create regulations to block transactions prohibited by 
the UIGEA.121  By doing so, the court expanded its earlier interpretation to 
allow for broader umbrella coverage of the UIGEA as it applies to any fi-
nancial institution that in any way participates in an Internet gaming wa-
ger.122  The court ultimately upheld the UIGEA despite the vagueness ar-
gument and the fact that the court could not consistently define the 
UIGEA’s terms and conditions.123 
The court in Interactive suggested two alternative interpretations of 
the UIGEA.  The first interpretation limits the application of the UIGEA to 
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companies directly providing Internet gambling services.124  The second 
interpretation expands the UIGEA’s scope to include financial institu-
tions.125  Interestingly, the interpretation which quotes from the UIGEA—
the first interpretation—would actually frustrate the UIGEA’s purpose by 
limiting its application only to those industries directly related to gaming.  
Only under the court’s second interpretation would the UIGEA apply to fi-
nancial institutions.  This second, broader interpretation has been the stan-
dard for interpreting the UIGEA.126 
B. The UIGEA:  Void for Vagueness 
A statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if it is imprecise and indefinite, thereby encourag-
ing subjective enforcement.127  The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforce-
ment Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) is thus argued to be unconstitutionally vague 
on its face because it fails to properly and workably define the term “un-
lawful Internet gambling,” which has no generally accepted definition.128  
The court in Interactive responded to this concern by dramatically over-
simplifying the issue, finding that the UIGEA is meant to defer to state 
laws, so that Internet gambling is only unlawful when a state law says it 
is.129  Yet, the court failed to address the additional ambiguity created by 
such a response due to the drastic inconsistencies between state laws.130  
For instance, nearly all states allow for some form of gambling, including 
“skill gaming” and “sweepstakes,” which have become multi-million dollar 
industries.131  The popularity of skill gaming and sweepstakes has increased 
because most state laws prohibit lottery and gambling, which involve:  “(1) 
the award of a prize, (2) determined on the basis of chance, and (3) where 
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consideration was paid.”132 
Similarly, the UIGEA places great focus on the distinction between 
those games which are primarily determined on the basis of chance, and 
those which are not.133  The UIGEA creates special exemptions for only a 
few selected games of chance, such as fantasy sport contests, provided that: 
 
(1) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants 
are established and made known to the participants in 
advance of the game . . . . 
 
(2) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge 
and skill of the participants and are determined pre-
dominantly by accumulated statistical results of the per-
formance of individuals . . . in multiple real-world 
sporting or other events. 
 
(3) No winning outcome is based (aa) on the score, point-
spread, or any performance or performances of any sin-
gle real-world team or any combination of such teams; 
or (bb) solely on any single performance of an individ-
ual athlete in any single real-world sporting or other 
event.134 
 
However, the UIGEA does not establish a list of unlawful activities to 
be regulated by banks and credit unions.135  One questionable activity is 
Texas Hold ‘Em Poker, which has “exploded in popularity in recent years,” 
with televised professional tournaments and cash games becoming a part of 
mainstream coverage.136  Most professional players of the game make a liv-
ing from it because they understand the fundamental concepts that render it 
a game of skill.137  Yet, critics of the game often insist that it is a game of 
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“imperfect information and chance outcomes.”138 
 To understand why poker is a game of skill rather than chance, it is 
necessary to start with a basic understanding of the laws of probability.  
Consider a coin toss where the probability of landing on heads or tails is 
fifty percent.  The result of one coin toss is generally referred to as a gam-
ble.139  If the tosses were done repeatedly, however, any such gamble 
would be eliminated since any “positive expectation” of repeatedly choos-
ing one side would eventually be zero.140  In other words, gambles do exist 
in short-term, single experiment analyses.  However, it is always true that 
“mathematical probability is not overcome in the long term . . . .”141  Poker 
statistical calculations operate similarly.  While a player may lose a hand or 
two despite heavy odds in his or her favor, the poker player envisions the 
game in terms of long-term expectations, calculating the statistics of each 
hand as though it would be performed an infinite number of times.142  The 
player who can skillfully calculate his or her odds and continue to play 
tends to win in the long run, making poker a true game of skill, not 
chance.143  After all, it is no surprise that “the same five guys make it to the 
final table of the World Series of Poker every single year[.]”144 
Despite clear indications to the contrary, courts have reached different 
results on the status of poker as a game of skill.145  For instance, in a recent 
case involving illegal gambling, Colorado District Judge James Hartmann 
concluded, “[a] poker player may give himself a statistical advantage 
through skill or experience, but that player is always subject to defeat when 
the next card is turned.”146  While technically true, this phenomenon does 
not account for a player’s long-term expectations.147  Regardless of their 
validity, these conflicting opinions create confusion for those attempting to 
interpret the UIGEA.  In Interactive, the court made it clear that the 
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UIGEA is to be clarified by state statutes.148  State legislatures, in turn, 
have established a practice of creating statutes that distinguish between 
games of skill and chance.149  Yet, state courts that are reviewing these 
statutes cannot determine whether poker falls into the category of skill or 
chance.150  In effect, the UIGEA defers to state laws that are essentially in-
cognizable. 
Adding to the confusion, the UIGEA goes on to specifically exempt 
certain games of skill, including “investments in securities, commodities, 
over-the-counter derivatives, and insurance.”151  The UIGEA also includes 
various activities which incorporate a high element of chance, creating 
more uncertainty.  After all, “the only difference between gambling at a ca-
sino and day trading stock online is that you have to serve yourself drinks 
when sitting at your home computer.”152  While poker deals primarily with 
statistical calculations,153 stock predictions generally take into account the 
actions of other living human beings who are agents of free will and ulti-
mately unpredictable.154   
For these reasons, the UIGEA’s “skill versus chance” distinction be-
comes utterly incomprehensible, leaving the interpreter of the UIGEA in a 
position of not knowing which activities are outlawed and which are al-
lowed.  Consequently, as the pressure mounts on United States financial 
institutions to begin implementing the regulatory provision of the UIGEA, 
they are faced with the immense burden of figuring out what exactly they 
are meant to enforce.155   
C. UIGEA’s Effects on Financial Institutions  
One of the primary concerns with the vagueness of the Unlawful In-
ternet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) and its failure to 
successfully define “unlawful Internet gambling” is the effect it will have 
on financial institutions throughout the nation.  Aside from the requirement 
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that financial institutions determine which games are unlawful based on 
state laws, financial institutions will have to bear an even more cumber-
some burden of locating transactions that fall within the elusive defini-
tion.156 
 The UIGEA specifically states that financial institutions are to adopt 
policies and procedures for the purpose of blocking Internet gambling ac-
tivities.157  The UIGEA directs the Secretary of the Treasury and the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to work with the U.S. Attor-
ney General in identifying and blocking illegal Internet gambling transac-
tions.158  By late 2007, these agencies had used a macro approach to de-
velop a set of proposed rules, whereby they identified five distinct 
categories of payment systems:  (1) card; (2) check collection; (3) wire 
transfer; (4) money transmission; and (5) automated clearing house.159  The 
agencies set up specific regulations for each of these payment systems so 
that financial institutions would not have to bear the burden of establishing 
their own regulations.160 Thus, when a payment system complies with an 
agency’s proposed set of rules, it will be deemed to comply with the 
UIGEA.161  Alternatively, the agency could choose to establish its own set 
of procedures.162 
 Realizing that it would be nearly impossible for most financial insti-
tutions to identify which of its transactions were associated with Internet 
gambling using their current infrastructure, the agencies established a set of 
broad exemptions.163  These included exemptions for all automated clearing 
house systems, check collections systems, and wire transfer system partici-
pants without direct relationships with customers involved in the Internet 
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gambling business.164  The exemptions were a response to the companies’ 
inability to “accurately identify and block certain restricted transactions.”165  
Yet, the agencies created no exemptions for card systems and money 
transmitting businesses, effectively leaving them with the burden of analyz-
ing each processed transaction to determine whether it is directly associated 
with illegal Internet gambling.166  Such a system would require extensive 
resources in an effort to investigate each transaction and determine if it vio-
lates the law of any one of the fifty United States jurisdictions.167  Costs as-
sociated with recordkeeping in this type of system have been estimated to 
be four million dollars annually, not including preliminary expenses, such 
as the implementation of the system.168  With no mention of any govern-
ment reimbursement for such expenses, it becomes apparent that financial 
institutions will be left to cover the tab.169 
 In addition to the aforementioned burdens, financial institutions 
would also have to reconcile state laws with UIGEA exemptions.170  The 
Act currently bans “staking or risking . . . something of value . . . upon an 
agreement or understanding that . . . another person will receive something 
of value in the event of a certain outcome[.]”171  As previously discussed, 
the Act makes specific exemptions for insurance, over-the-counter deriva-
tives, securities investments, and commodities.172  The problem is that 
“hedge funds and offshore reinsurance contracts do not fit neatly into any 
of these categories.”173  When faced with these transactions, financial insti-
tutions must determine, on an individual basis, whether they should be in-
cluded within the UIGEA exemptions.174  Compliance with the Act is es-
sentially left to an individualized interpretive methodology, whereby 
institutions are given little to no guidelines to assist them in determining 
how to treat these unaccounted-for transactions.175 
Another problem arises with online transactions, which have gener-
ally been accepted as legal but appear to fit the mold for “unlawful Internet 
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gambling” created by Congress via the UIGEA.176  More specifically, on-
line auctions, like those on eBay, could easily be construed as chance-based 
transactions since their values “depend[] on the number of participants, and 
the outcome is uncertain.”177  The UIGEA does not properly address these 
common transactions, leaving financial institutions to interpret the bounda-
ries of legislative provisions, a task better suited for the legislative or judi-
cial branches.  Moreover, where a state law does not exempt the same ac-
tivities as the UIGEA, financial institutions will have to reconcile the 
federal and state laws.178  Not only is this role of lawmaker and law inter-
preter inappropriate for an entity which is unelected and inexperienced, it 
also creates a massive burden of having to determine the legality of each 
transaction on an ad hoc basis.  This could lead to an absurd scenario 
wherein two financial institutions enforce the same Internet gambling regu-
lation upon the same individual in two distinct ways.179 
D. Privacy Rights and the UIGEA 
Comments on a proposed rule to implement the Act have shown that 
many consumers agree with Interactive that gambling in one’s own home 
should be a private determination.180  These consumers argue that the Act 
allows too much “inappropriate governmental intrusion into citizens’ pri-
vate affairs.”181 Should gamblers choose to play from their own homes, it 
should be their prerogative to do so.  As Massachusetts Democratic Repre-
sentative, Barney Frank, put it, “If American citizens . . . want to gamble, 
let them.”182 
Aside from the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006’s (“UIGEA”) infringement on individual choice, serious privacy con-
cerns arise as to the regulatory methods financial institutions will resort to 
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when regulating Internet gambling.183  The Financial Services Roundtable, 
a representative of several United States financial institutions, has made 
clear that the UIGEA, “[u]nder the proposed rules, forces financial services 
entities to perform police functions more appropriate for law enforcement 
agencies.”184  These institutions will have to take measures to establish an 
entirely revised system of internal controls, requiring vast additional re-
sources for implementing the system, including training and mainte-
nance.185  Because online gambling transactions are often of small value, 
systematic oversight will require the monitoring of nearly every transaction 
that passes through a company’s database.186  This responsibility exacer-
bates the already immense burden financial institutions bear in applying the 
UIGEA.187 
More importantly, this ad hoc system of review by financial institu-
tions likely threatens individual privacy, for companies become more will-
ing to reject legitimate transactions than risk the possibility that they fall 
outside the boundaries of the UIGEA.188  Bank of America, for example, 
has expressly indicated that it will likely be forced to block legitimate 
transactions in an effort to enforce a potentially ambiguous act.189  This is 
because the UIGEA “requires banks and other institutions to know the pur-
pose and legality of payments in an industry.”190  Thus, the UIGEA effec-
tively becomes a threat, not only to the privacy of individuals that partici-
pate in Internet gambling, but to everyone who utilizes financial institutions 
for any monetary transaction.191   
While financial institutions are most concerned with the costly im-
plementations of the UIGEA, they are not who will ultimately suffer from 
UIGEA regulation.192  Banks and credit unions will be inclined to pass the 
expenses to consumers by lowering interest rates on deposits and invest-
ments as well as increasing the rates on loans.193  While banks and other in-
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stitutions will be left with the tasks of establishing the necessary protocol 
and determining how to comply with the UIGEA’s provisions, ultimately, 
“[c]onsumers, not stockholders, will end up paying the bills.”194 
V. THE REAL EFFECTS OF THE UIGEA 
Proponents of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 
2006 (“UIGEA”) are certain that the Act is destined to minimize Internet 
gambling throughout the nation.195  However, even with the proper infra-
structure, it is questionable whether the UIGEA would ultimately serve that 
purpose.196  After all, Internet sports betting and virtual casino sites are al-
ready illegal in the United States, but nothing has stopped American gam-
blers from reaching the thousands of sites based overseas.197  Even with the 
recent FBI takeover of three of the largest internet gambling sites in the na-
tion, the UIGEA will not be the effective tool for curbing the widespread 
hobby that the legislature hopes it will be.198 
A. Internet Gambling Continues to Flourish 
The American Banking Association (“ABA”) has declared the Un-
lawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) “an un-
precedented delegation of governmental responsibility with no prospect of 
practical success in exchange for all the burden it imposes.”199  According 
to the ABA, the proposed rules would promote foreign correspondent 
banks to help identify and block illegal Internet gambling transactions, but, 
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at the same time, could “rais[e] more problems than [they] solv[e].”200 
Many financial institutions have taken a direct approach to the prob-
lem by negotiating settlement agreements and non-prosecution agreements 
with the Department of Justice.201  For instance, Electronic Clearing House, 
a Nevada-based corporation, negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with 
the Department of Justice when the Department learned that the corpora-
tion was involved in money transfers for “e-wallets,” or online payment 
services.202  However, several online gamblers have resorted to less legiti-
mate overseas-based gambling operations, which effectively “forc[e] these 
problems into the shadows where they’re harder to address and mak[e] it 
impossible to enlist the industry in helping to fight them.”203  Instead of 
minimizing Internet gaming, the UIGEA punishes reputable and responsi-
ble Internet gambling services by turning gamblers to less legitimate off-
shore providers that can evade UIGEA enforcement.204  Ironically, the 
UIGEA only promotes industry fraud and corruption, which is what its 
proponents have said it was meant to prevent.205 
B. How Applicable is the UIGEA? 
Assuming, arguendo, that the UIGEA is successfully implemented, 
companies will be prohibited only from accepting wagers of players within 
a state whose laws prohibit Internet gambling.206  The reality is that only six 
states have laws that ban Internet gambling, while the remaining forty-four 
have not enacted any legislation making Internet gambling illegal.207  Con-
sequently, in addition to ignoring the numerous flaws in the UIGEA, the 
Act would likely not result in an actual ban of Internet gambling in the en-
tire United States until the legislators in the remaining forty-four states pass 
legislation explicitly banning Internet gambling.208  Again, the Act falls 
short of its intended outcome, resulting in a heavy burden of enforcement 
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that outweighs any benefits.209  
VI. REGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE UIGEA 
 On a practical level, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) is simply unenforceable.210  The President and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Governmental Employees Credit Union has 
even stated that the “check-processing systems would come to a stand-still 
if financial institutions [had] to review each check to determine if the pay-
ment was made to fund illegal gambling activities.”211  As a result of this 
practical impossibility, most financial services favor the possibility of regu-
lating Internet gambling as opposed to implementing an outright ban.212 
Modern financial institutions are more equipped to regulate Internet 
gambling than to enforce a total ban.213  With respect to the issue of minors 
engaging in Internet gambling, modern-day age-verification software and 
government databases, in combination with strict operating procedures, 
would serve to easily prevent underage players from accessing gambling 
sites.214  Sites could also cross-reference drivers’ licenses and voter regis-
tration lists to verify that a player is not underage.215  The mere possibility 
of underage gambling does not justify an outright ban on Internet gam-
bling, since simple, alternative solutions already exist to solve this prob-
lem.216 
 Even more compelling a reason to regulate Internet gambling is the 
potential for great social benefit.217  Rather than establishing a guise of 
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prohibition while allowing Internet gambling to thrive in an underground 
arena, the government could instead regulate it and impose a hefty tax.218  
In 2005, Internet gambling revenues reached ten billion dollars.219  The In-
ternal Revenue Service taxed none of it, since the “agency had no way of 
tracking or regulating profits and winnings.”220  Meanwhile, the United 
States remained at a budget deficit of $455 billion during the fiscal year 
ending September 2008.221  The nation could have yielded as much as $43 
billion in tax revenue from online gambling, over the course of ten years, as 
estimated by the consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers.222  If not for any 
of the aforementioned reasons, the United States should follow its foreign 
counterparts in regulating Internet gambling for the financial incentives.223  
In the current economic downturn, Congress should consider repealing the 
highly ineffective UIGEA and substituting a regulatory provision that 
would benefit a troubled United States economy.224 Steve Wynn, Chairman 
and CEO of Wynn Resorts Ltd., stated that “[they] are convinced that the 
lack of regulation of Internet gaming within the U.S. must change. . . .  We 
must recognize that this activity is occurring and that law enforcement does 
not have the tools to stop it. . . .  It is time that the thousands of jobs created 
by this business and the potentially significant tax dollars come home to the 
U.S."225 
 In May 2009, Barney Frank sought to make this a reality when he 
proposed the Internet Gambling Regulation Consumer Protection and En-
forcement Act (“IGRCPEA”) to replace the ban imposed by the UIGEA 
with a federal system for regulating online gaming.226  The IGRCPEA 
seeks to regulate and tax online gambling and to push back the December 
1, 2009 date on which the proposed UIGEA rules were scheduled to take 
effect.227  Although Frank introduced the legislation in May 2009, it was set 
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aside as a result of the legislative need to focus on the deteriorating United 
States economy.228   However, in late 2009, Frank was able to win over his 
sixtieth co-sponsor for the bill.229  By delaying the implementation of the 
UIGEA for one more year, Frank’s prospects for overturning the Act and 
implementing his proposed regulatory legislation are promising.230 Mean-
while, major gambling Nevada corporations, including Ceasars Entertain-
ment Corp., MGM Resorts, and Wynn Resorts, along with representatives 
like Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, have undertaken their own efforts 
to push for federal regulation of internet gaming, as opposed to an outright 
ban.231 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The history of the United States is filled with ongoing disfavor to-
wards gambling institutions.232  While this disfavor is seemingly consistent 
over all forms of gambling, certain gaming has been given preferential 
treatment by the nation’s regulating entities.233  This preference has been 
masked by the cloak of a “chance versus skill” analysis.234  Clear games of 
skill, such as poker, have been regularly categorized as games of chance by 
observers unfamiliar with the long-term analyses on which the games are 
based.235  The most recent attack on gambling, the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”), is the first to successfully tar-
get the Internet gambling arena.236  In Interactive Media Entertainment & 
Gaming Association v. Attorney General of the U.S., the Third Circuit up-
held the constitutional validity of the UIGEA.237  However, the Act should 
be found unconstitutionally vague in defining what unlawful Internet gam-
bling actually is238 and the threat that it poses to individual privacy.239  
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Apart from its constitutional defects, the Act also fails for several other rea-
sons:  (1) it poses excessive burdens on financial institutions;240 (2) it is in-
applicable in the majority of jurisdictions it seeks to regulate;241 and (3) its 
enforcement would be counterproductive to the legislature’s stated intent, 
since most online gambling providers are simply relocating themselves 
overseas, beyond the reach of regulation.242  The Supreme Court should 
overturn the decision and declare the UIGEA unconstitutional on its face.  
Alternatively, Congress should consider the recently proposed legislation 
seeking to overturn the UIGEA and implement a federal regulatory mecha-
nism that could establish credible and responsible Internet gambling busi-
nesses and significantly contribute to national tax revenue.243   The UIGEA 
is yesterday’s bill which deals with yesterday’s issues, not tomorrow’s.244 
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